Judging Judges: The Effect of Courtroom Ceremony on Participant Evaluation of Process Fairness-Related Factors by Chase, Oscar G & Thong, Jonathan
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Volume 24 | Issue 1 Article 10
January 2012
Judging Judges: The Effect of Courtroom




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh
Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Oscar G. Chase & Jonathan Thong, Judging Judges: The Effect of Courtroom Ceremony on Participant Evaluation of Process Fairness-
Related Factors, 24 Yale J.L. & Human. (2012).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol24/iss1/10
Judging Judges: The Effect of Courtroom
Ceremony on Participant Evaluation of
Process Fairness-Related Factors
Oscar G. Chase & Jonathan Thong*
In this Essay, we describe a study of the effects of ceremonial aspects
of litigation on law student evaluation of a moot court oral argument
exercise. That begs the question: why study the ceremonial practices of
courts? Those practices seem on their face to have little relationship to the
traditional proceduralist concerns of accuracy, efficiency, cost, and
integrity. In our view, however, judicial ceremony has been understudied
and underappreciated as a source of (or barrier to) the legitimacy of
judicial institutions. Students of the social psychology of procedural
justice have empirical support for the claim that litigant evaluation of a
legal process is based in part on their assessments of procedures, and is to
some extent independent of their evaluation of outcome fairness.
Procedures judged to be fair by litigants have been found to increase
compliance with adverse judgments and respect for the rule of law. It is a
plausible-but until now unexamined-hypothesis that the ceremonial
formality of court processes contributes to a positive evaluation of the
process.
Ceremonial practices common in American courtrooms have hardly
been without controversy. In one of the most important critical treatments
of judicial ceremony, the late American federal judge Jerome Frank
mentioned three possible general effects, focusing on the judicial robe.'
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(He tellingly called his essay "The Cult of the Robe.") First, the robe
could enhance the prestige of the judge and, hence, respect for the judicial
process. He cites Pascal to the effect that "august apparel" is necessary to
promote respect for judicial decisions. In the same vein, uniform
appearance of the judges could promote the idea that justice is itself
"uniform," which also might increase respect for the "rule of law."
Second, the robe could be a "harmless relic" that has no impact on anyone
and is worn just as a matter of tradition. Finally, it could create "disquiet"
in lawyers, litigants, and witnesses, which would reduce their satisfaction
with the experience and interfere with efficient and accurate fact finding.
Frank endorses the last point, mentioning with favor the few judges who
do not wear robes in court and urging that the robe be abolished. His only
evidence for the proposition that robes are harmful is anecdotal. Though
Frank wrote over half a century ago, none of his hypotheses have been
studied empirically.
Jerome Frank's negative assessment of judicial ceremony was
apparently shared by former Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger,
who opined that "[t]he notion that ordinary people want black-robed
judges, well-dressed lawyers, and fine paneled courtrooms as the setting
to resolve their disputes is not correct. People with problems, like people
with pain, want relief, and they want it as quickly and inexpensively as
possible."2 But that view is not universally shared. According to one
contemporary student of the Supreme Court, Christopher Tomlins, the
ritualistic conventions of the Supreme Court, such as the dignified black
robes and the imposing marble columns, are in fact and by design
associated with a sense of authoritative and unbiased justice.' Said
Tomlins, later,
Those kinds of appearances are not simply the ephemera that
accompanies what the court really does-hears arguments, makes
decisions, writes opinions-they are important in their own right .
. . I think it is fairly safe to assume that the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices realize that how they appear is of some
considerable importance to how they are perceived and,
consequently, to the authority that they wield.4
2. Warren E. Burger, Our Vicious Legal Spiral, 16 JUDGES J. 23, 49 (1977).
3. Christopher Tomlins, Characterizing the Supreme Court, Introduction to THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE at xi, xiii (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005) [hereinafter
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT]; see Katherine Fischer Taylor, First Appearances: The Material
Setting and Culture of the Early Supreme Court, in UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, supra, at 357,
362-64.
4. Christopher Tomilins, Pursuing Justice, Cultivating Power: The Evolving Role of the Supreme
Court in the American Polity, 17 RESEARCHING L., no. 1, 2006, at 1, 8; see also OSCAR G. CHASE,
The Role of Ritual, in LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING PROCESSES IN CROSS-CULTURAL
CONTEXT, 114 (2005) (describing the role of ritual in diverse disputing institutions); Antoine Garapon,
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There may be truth in both views. People with disputes may want
"relief" as Chief Justice Burger suggested, but the degree to which they
actually feel relieved is affected by attributes of the proceeding through
which their dispute has been addressed.s
The study of courtroom ritual and its effects is not only a matter of
theoretical interest. Learning about the effects of courtroom ceremony can
lead to improvements in both judicial proceedings and alternative dispute
resolution processes. For example, there are differences of opinion among
designers of ADR programs about whether court-annexed processes such
as arbitration and mediation should use ceremonies similar to those used
in courts or should be more informal. Furthermore, some judges eschew
courtroom formality and do not wear robes because they believe it inhibits
the search for truth and is off-putting for participants. Moreover, when
new courts are constituted, either because of profound regime change (as
in South Africa, where the Constitutional Court was created after the fall
of apartheid) or because of the growing need for new transnational
tribunals (such as the International Criminal Court), the design of
ceremony is unavoidably confronted. Finally, and especially important, is
the hypothesized contribution of judicial ceremony to litigant and public
confidence in courts. Tyler and Lind6 and Thibault and Walker' have
found that assessments of the fairness of procedures are linked to peoples'
endorsement of the legal system in general. In sum, we need to learn
whether judicial ceremony enhances assessments of the adjudicative
process.
I. DEFINING CEREMONY
An assessment of the effect of ceremony requires a definition. What
kinds of practices count as "ceremonial"? The question is not easily
answered, because while one can theoretically divide practices into the
ceremonial on one hand, and the "instrumental" on the other, the
boundary between the two is not clear. Many ceremonies, after all, are
intended to serve some purpose and, in that sense, are also instrumental.
La Robe Judicaire, in BIEN JUGER, ESSAI SUR LE RITUEL JUDICAIRE 71 (1997) (exploring the
legitimizing power of ritual vestments in the courts of France).
5. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their
Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & SOC'Y REv. 953 (1990).
6. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH
IN LAW 65 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).
7. See JOHN THIBAULT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975).
8. Sally F. Moore & Barbara G. Myerhoff, Secular Ritual: Forms and Meanings, Introduction to
SECULAR RITUAL 3, 15 (Sally Falk Moore & Barbara G. Myerhoff eds., 1977) (describing the
difficulty of making a "radical separation" between rituals and instrumental behavior and noting that
"[r]itualization may have both purposive and communicative properties . . . ."). The authors
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And many instrumental practices take on ceremonial qualities through
repetition and association with particular practices.' Following Moore,
Myerhoff, and others, we will consider a practice ceremonial if it
apparently conveys important symbolic meaning, even if it also serves
some non-symbolic purpose: "The formal properties of ceremony are thus
not sufficient to distinguish it from other cultural phenomena . . .. It is in
the area of meaning and effect that the distinction may be more clearly
drawn . . . ."1o Thus, the black robe worn by a judge may serve the
purpose of identifying the role of a particular person who is one of many
in a courtroom, but it does so through the use of a particular "sign" that is
symbolic of her authority.
We thus consider the following practices as "ceremonial" in that they
are symbols in the above sense:
* distinctive architectural features of the building in which the
court is housed;
* distinctive decorative elements of the courtroom;
* distinctive furniture arrangement in the courtroom, such as a
raised "bench" from which the judge or judges preside;
* distinctive apparel customarily worn by the judge (a robe or
a wig);
* distinctive apparel customarily worn by the advocates;
* distinctive forms of address used when speaking to the
judge;
* distinctive customary modes of deportment in the courtroom
(such as rising when the judge enters).
By "distinctive" we mean that the practice is distinctive to courts and
not otherwise generally found in the particular society examined. Put
another way, it is a practice that signifies that the space is a "courtroom"
and that the proceedings are judicial.
The ceremonial aspects of judicial proceedings in the U.S. and
elsewhere are obvious. In the U.S. they include distinctive forms of dress,
behavior, locution, and place. As a general rule, the higher the court in the
judicial hierarchy, the more magnificent will be the space of the court and
frequently use "ritual" and "ceremony" interchangeably. See, e.g., id. at 8.
9. "Collective ceremony" has been characterized by its "formal properties," including, and
especially relevant here: "'Special behavior' or stylization: actions or symbols used are extra-ordinary
themselves, or ordinary ones are used in an unusual way, a way that calls attention to them and sets
them apart from other, mundane uses." Moore & Myerhoff, supra note 8, at 7.
10. Id. at 8; see also Mary Gluckman & Max Gluckman, On Drama, and Games and Athletic
Contests, in SECULAR RITuALs, supra note 8, at 227, 233 (using Max Gluckman's term "ceremonial"
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the more stylized will be its processes.
In this study we examine only the impact of location and judicial attire.
We consider those to be the most prominent features of courtroom
ceremonial practices. Examination of other ceremonial attributes listed
above, such as forms of address and physical deportment, would not have
been practicable. Since our study did not involve video or audio recording
of the processes and relied solely on reporting by the subjects as described
below, we could not have sufficient confidence in subject recollection and
assessment of verbal and physical behavior to use those as variables.
II. THE HYPOTHESIS
The Oral Argument Study tests the hypothesis that two variables,
setting and judicial attire, have a positive effect on participant evaluation
of judicial behavior as measured by widely accepted elements of process
satisfaction. Analogous support for the hypothesized enhanced effect of
judicial attire on participants is found in a recent study of physician attire
in the U.S." Survey respondents were presented with pictures of male and
female "doctors" in four different kinds of attire: normal business attire,
"professional" attire (i.e., a white lab coat over business attire), surgical
"scrubs," and casual attire. They were asked to choose among the doctors
pictured for a variety of clinical purposes. Respondents "overwhelmingly"
favored doctors in "professional" attire. They had greater trust and
confidence in those doctors, were more willing to discuss intimate
personal matters with them, and expressed a greater willingness to return
to those doctors for follow-up treatment. Moreover, doctors dressed
professionally were "positively associated with respondent commitment
to adhere to prescribed therapy."l 2 The results are similar to those of other
studies "conducted worldwide in a variety of settings." 3
The subjects of our study were first-year students at New York
University (NYU) School of Law. This hypothesis invokes psychological
studies of participant evaluation of process satisfaction. Investigations of
the psychology of procedural justice support the propositions that are the
central findings of that school: disputants can and do evaluate the fairness
of processes independently of the fairness of outcomes and are "more
satisfied with the outcomes they receive when they feel that court
procedures are fair."l 4 More complex issues are raised when we ask what
characteristics of process lead to a favorable view of its fairness. Tyler
11. S.U. Rehman et al., What To Wear Today? Effect of Doctor's Attire on the Trust and
Confidence ofPatients, 118 AM. J. MED. 1279 (2005).
12. Id. at 1284.
13. Id.
14. Tyler & Lind, supra note 6, at 71; THIBAULT & WALKER, supra note 7, at 80.
2012] 225
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and Lind, focusing on "group-value," have emphasized "the symbolic and
psychological" implications of procedures for feelings of inclusion in
society and for the belief that the institution using the procedure holds the
person in high regard."s They identify three litigant beliefs as "crucial to
judgments of procedural justice." These are that authorities are
trustworthy (a factor Tyler calls "trust"); that the participant is treated by
authorities as a full-fledged member of society ("standing"); and that he
or she is accorded evenhanded nondiscriminatory treatment
("neutrality").16 In a subsequent article Tyler added a fourth "critical"
factor, "voice in the decision making process," i.e., "people want to have
an opportunity to state their case to legal authorities."" Tyler and Lind
also argue that people use fairness process evaluations as a "heuristic" to
decide whether they have been treated fairly, which then influences their
decision to comply with the decision.' Because most people are neither
equipped nor have the time to make full and independent evaluations of
the substantive outcome they receive, the fairness heuristic gives them a
cognitive tool for assessing the process before learning the result. Under
this theory, people look to behavioral cues-such as the level of respect,
understanding, and attention they are receiving-to determine fairness of
procedure.
Fairness heuristic theory argues that people use the factors they do
to arrive at impressions of fairness because questions like respect,
consideration, and neutrality are the sorts of things that people feel
most comfortable in making judgments about. However irrational
it might seem, at first glance, to use judgments of an authority's
politeness or of a procedure's dignity to arrive at judgments of
whether one is being treated fairly, these are social signs and
symbols that people are comfortable interpreting.' 9
To bring this back to the current inquiry, judicial ceremony could
reasonably be thought to contribute to both appearance of neutrality and
perception of respect for the litigant. The judge's robe and the other
ceremonial symbols of the courtroom are in this sense "social signs" that
the judge has put aside her individuality and assumed the role of an
authority acting "under law"-that is, deciding according to neutral
principles. Further, the person who has been granted access to the
elaborately staged process will arguably experience feelings of inclusion
and respect. Alternatively, we can hypothesize that a participant-
15. Tyler & Lind, supra note 6, at 75.
16. Id.
17. Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of
Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 661, 664 (2007).
18. Tyler & Lind, supra note 6, at 77.
19. Id. at 80.
226 [Vol. 24:221
6
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol24/iss1/10
Chase & Thong
especially if not a repeat player-will feel disrespected and disinclined to
trust the judge if the court in which he is heard does not measure up to
expectations based on iconic images with which he is familiar. Tyler
suggests that individuals are more likely to think a process just and fair,
and are more likely to comply with the result, if they perceive the
authorities as acting according to the rule of law.20 The robe and other
regalia that are emblematic of the judicial process arguably add to the
dignity of the setting and may serve as heuristics that signal the judge's
commitment to the rule of law.
We note here that the value of our study is influenced by, but not
dependent on, the procedural justice psychology findings cited above: it is
useful to learn whether judicial ceremony affects participant evaluations
regardless of the theoretical explanation for it.
To be sure, the work of Tyler, Lind, and other investigators of the
psychology of procedural justice has not escaped criticism. Two themes
are particularly relevant here. One concerns the limitations of the
experimental methodology on which they have largely relied.2 1 As
Chevigny observed, "[i]t seems likely, for example, that subjects,
especially college or law students like those used in many of the
experiments, might express a stronger preference for fair procedures in a
setting where the outcome does not actually matter to them."2 2 That
concern is relevant to our study as well, inasmuch as the subjects, first-
year law students, may have already been acculturated to value the
ceremonial accoutrements of the judicial process more than the general
population. However, Tyler's critics have generally concluded that his
"key findings," having been supported by field studies, are "persuasive." 23
And, contrary to the view of those critics, one could expect that law
students, already trained in the legal requirements of effective and fair
procedures, would be less influenced by "mere" ceremony than lay
participants in the legal process. Since our methodology approximates
that of prior researchers in this genre, we believe that, while our own
conclusions cannot be willy-nilly applied to a more general population,
our findings at the very least suggest more extensive future investigation,
using field studies where possible.
A second theme sounded by critics of Tyler's work focuses on its
arguable narrowness of scope and failure to appreciate its political
20. Tyler, supra note 17, at 661.
21. See Paul G. Chevigny, Fairness and Participation, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1211 (1989) (book
review); Valerie P. Hans, Judgments of Justice, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 218 (1992) (book review); Layla
Skinns, Tyler, TR., & Huo, YJ. (2002). Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the
Police and the Courts, 32 CRIM. JUST. REV. 456 (2007) (book review).
22. Chevigny, supra note 21, at 1212.
23. Hans, supra note 20, at 219; see also Chevigny, supra note 21, at 1212.
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implications.24 The finding that the propensity to accept authority when it
is exercised through processes seen as fair, these critics claim, opens the
door to manipulation and may lead to false consciousness. Thus, Tyler et
al. can be faulted for failing to critically engage the power-legitimizing
implications of their work. Since we do not in this Essay explore political
implications, we are also subject to this critique. Nonetheless, we believe
that empirical investigation into a practice as widely followed as judicial
ceremony is valuable in itself. The critical analysis of these practices will,
we hope, be furthered by our findings and is indeed one of our
motivations.
III. THE ORAL ARGUMENT STUDY
A. Survey Description
First-year NYU School of Law students are required to participate in a
moot court argument. In the years in which the study was conducted, the
students were randomly assigned to argue for or against a motion for a
preliminary injunction. Every student pair was assigned the same case and
motion to argue. Although the class is graded on a pass/fail basis, faculty
report that students took the exercise seriously and that many spent
several weeks preparing their briefs and oral presentations.
The volunteer "judges" presiding over the argument may be law
professors, local practitioners outside of the law faculty, or members of
the judiciary. The argument may be held in a moot courtroom (which
could be at a law firm office or at the law school), the courtroom of an
actual sitting judge, or a conference room at a law firm or courthouse.
Given the large number of arguments that must be accommodated, some
disparity within the location categories is unavoidable. For example, a
conference room at a large New York law firm is likely to be more
imposing than that of a small firm or public interest organization.
Similarly, some law firms made formal moot courtrooms available, while
the moot courtrooms at the law school are multi-purpose rooms that are
arranged as courtrooms on an ad hoc basis.
The oral argument presented a ready-made opportunity to study the
effects of place and attire on this cohort by surveying participating
students about their evaluation of fairness-related ingredients after the
conclusion of the argument. The survey was constructed to investigate
whether the type of venue in which the argument was held and/or the
judge's attire (robe vs. business attire) affected the students' assessment
24. See Chevigny, supra note 20, at 122; Hans, supra note 21, at 219; Austin Sarat, Authority,
Anxiety, and Procedural Justice: Moving from Scientific Detachment to Critical Engagement, 27
LAW & SOC'Y REv. 647, 659 (1993) (book review); Skinns, supra note 21, at 457.
228 [Vol. 24:22.1
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of the dignity of the setting and of judicial behavior. The factors tested
were those shown to be associated with participant satisfaction with an
adjudicatory process: respectfulness, attentiveness, knowledge, the
understanding of the decision-maker, and the dignity of the setting.25 The
role of costume was introduced by requesting a random number of the
presiding judges to wear judicial robes, while others were asked to preside
in normal business attire. Judicial robes were provided to the persons who
simulated judges for the exercise.
The study proceeded in two phases. In the first phase, a survey was
administered by e-mail to all of the students who participated in the
exercise in academic year 2007. In the second phase, conducted in the
2009 academic year, the same survey was administered only to those first-
year students in the 2009 cohort who presented their oral argument to a
sitting judge in a real courtroom. All of the judges presiding in 2009 were
asked to preside wearing business attire, not judicial robes. The purpose
of the second phase survey was to obtain a sample of arguments
conducted in real courtrooms before real judges who did not wear robes.
That was desirable because all of the real judges who had presided in
courtrooms in 2007 wore robes; the 2009 survey therefore allowed us to
isolate the effect of robes from that of the courtroom. There is no reason
to believe that the students in the 2009 sample would have non-random
differences from the 2007 sample, because the oral argument was based
on the same fact and law for both samples and because all students were
assigned to their argument venues by the program administrators at
random. We therefore combined the responses from the two samples in
the analysis that follows. 2 6
Students were asked by e-mail to complete an attached survey and
return it by e-mail to the law school technology office, not to the
investigators. Thus, students could be, and were, assured that their
surveys would be anonymous to the investigators. They were asked to rate
the judges on a five point scale for respectfulness, attentiveness,
knowledge, and understanding, and to assess the dignity of the setting and
the justness of the decision. As shown below, we then analyzed the
relation between these ratings and the two variables of place and attire.
We also investigated the impact of these factors on the student assessment
of the substantive justness of the decision.
B. Response Rates
In the first phase we obtained responses from 265 of the 450 students to
25. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 6, at 79-80.
26. We separately surveyed the judges who presided in 2007 for their evaluations of the students.
The results of that survey will be addressed in a separate paper.
2292012]
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whom the survey was distributed (i.e. all who completed the 2007
Lawyering course exercise). After excluding responses with errors and
incomplete entries, we were left with 258 responses. Under the
circumstances in which the survey was conducted, we conclude that that
was an acceptable response rate. The survey was announced to students
by an e-mail which asked them to participate by clicking on a link. They
were informed that participation was anonymous, was completely
voluntary, and was not an assignment of the course. As the oral advocacy
exercise was the final assignment of the spring semester, students were
preparing for final exams, and many may have regarded the survey
participation as an undesirable use of their time. While we acknowledge
that there may be a voluntary response bias in our survey results, we do
not believe it to be particularly strong, given the relatively low kurtosis of
the distribution of the survey responses. In other words, upon examining
the survey date we saw that the responses were well distiibuted across a
range of values as opposed to clustering in extreme values. In the second
survey, we obtained twenty-nine responses from the thirty-two students to
whom the survey had been distributed. (i.e. all of the students who had
argued in courtrooms before real judges).
C. Methodology
The survey, which was identical in both phases, sought responses to
twenty-five statements and invited respondents to add comments. For the
purposes of this Essay, we focus on the following key statements:
Statement 9: The judge listened to my argument attentively.
(Responses coded as variable "attme..")
Statement 10: The judge listened to my opponent attentively.
(Responses coded as variable "attop.")
Statement 11: The judge understood the points I made during the
argument.
(Responses coded as variable "underme.")
Statement 12: The judge understood the points my opponent made
during the argument.
(Responses coded as variable "underop.")
Statement 13: The judge was knowledgeable about the legal issue
involved in the case.
(Responses coded as variable "knowledge.")
Statement 14: The judge treated my argument with respect.
(Responses coded as variable "resme.")
Statement 15: The judge treated my opponent's argument with
230 [Vol. 24:221
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(Responses coded as variable "resop.")
Statement 16: The room in which the argument was held was
dignified.
(Responses coded as variable "dignified.")27
Statement 19: The decision the judge announced, if any, was a just
decision.
(Responses coded as variable "just.")
The respondent's agreement with each of these statements is measured
on a five-point scale starting at one, representing strong disagreement, and
rising to five, which denotes strong agreement. To test the hypothesis that
place and costume affect an individual's evaluation of judicial function
and behavior, we explore whether a statistical relationship exists between
these measures of perceived fairness and variables that characterize
location and costume. Specifically, respondents were asked to respond to
the subsequent two questions:
Statement 20: What was the location of the argument?
Statement 21: During your argument, did the judge wear any
clothing particular to the judicial role?
Respondents were instructed to indicate the kind of attire the judge
wore if they answered yes to that question. All who did so reported that
the judge wore a robe; some added that it was a black robe.28 The location
of the proceedings fell into one of three categories: courtroom, moot
courtroom, or conference room.2 9 According to our hypothesis, the
ceremonial aspects of the proceeding in the form of costume and place
will have a positive effect on participant evaluation of judicial behavior: a
more formal location and the use of a judicial robe should be associated
with higher levels of perceived judicial behavior and function. It is these
hypotheses that form the basis of our statistical inquiry.
27. Students were randomly assigned to one of a courtroom, a moot courtroom, or a conference
room.
28. The presence of judicial costume was measured using an indicator variable that takes value I
when judicial attire is present and 0 when it is not.
29. In order to convert the location responses into numerical variables, we define two indicator
variables. The first indicator variable takes value I if the proceedings were conducted in a courtroom
and 0 otherwise. The second indicator variable takes value I if the proceedings were conducted in a
conference room and 0 otherwise. The combination of these two variables provides a numerical
indicator of the location of the proceedings. For instance, if both indicator variables take value 0, then
the location of the proceedings must be in a moot courtroom.
2012] 231
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D. Effect of Variables
1. Perceived Room Dignity Enhanced Assessments of the Judge
As a first step in our analysis we examine the correlation between our
measures of judicial function30 and the perceived dignity of the room.3 1 In
performing this analysis we must take into consideration that the values
assigned to the observations have no intrinsic meaning or scale and are
thus ordinal in nature as opposed to cardinal where the intervals
measurements have a fixed intrinsic value. Rather, they merely represent
an ordering of a respondent's agreement with a statement. Thus we cannot
assume that to a respondent, the difference between a score of two or
three is the same as the difference between a score of four or five.32
Tables One and Two list the computed rank correlations using two
different measures to ensure the robustness of our result and the p-values
associated with a null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to zero.33
The results show that for every measure the rank correlation with
perceived room dignity is positive and strongly significant. That means
that the advocates who argued in surroundings they considered dignified
tended to perceive judges as more attentive, understanding,
knowledgeable, respectful, and just. Since correlations have no scale and
are bounded between the values of -1 and 1, what we can take from our
results is that these statistical relationships are positive and statistically
significant.34
2. Factors Affecting the Dignity Assessment
There are a variety of factors that might contribute to an individual's
perception of room dignity. In order to better understand that effect, we
control for two elements that we believe to be important determinants of
room dignity-judicial costume and location." As further developed
30. Statements 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, supra page 230.
31. Statement 16, supra page 231.
32. Since the measurement intervals between the observed values cannot be assumed to be
constant, standard measures such as Pearson's correlation coefficient and linear regression
coefficients that presume the data to be cardinal are not appropriate and may lead to biased statistical
results. Instead, we utilize non-parametric measures of correlation that only take into account ordinal
information. The natural choices for such a metric are Spearman's rank correlation and Kendall's Tau,
which are computed using the ranks of a given set of observations. See Appendix, infra page 241.
33. Tables I and 2. Again, we omit the standard Pearson's correlation, since it should only be
applicable to cardinal data (where the intervals measurements have a fixed intrinsic value), while our
data is ordinal in nature.
34. Due to the large number of observations in our data (over two hundred), large sample critical
values were deemed to be good approximations for these two tests.
35. Since judicial costume and location are randomly assigned, we may simply partition the data
set into responses falling into the different groups and conduct a statistical comparison. Again,
parametric methods that presume cardinal measurements such as difference-of-means tests and
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below, we find that the use of a judicial robe enhances respondents'
assessment of the judge's knowledge. Second, a courtroom was reported
to be more dignified than either a moot courtroom or a conference room.
3. The Effect of Robes
Line One of Table Three compares the response rankings of all students
arguing before a judge who wore a robe to those arguing before a judge
who did not, regardless of location.36 Under the null hypothesis of the
Mann-Whitney test, robes appear to have two strong effects upon a
student advocate's survey response. According to the computed test
statistics, we reject the null hypothesis at the five percent level of
significance for the statements associated with perceived knowledge37 and
the dignity of the room.3 8 Thus while the presence of a robe is indeed
associated with higher levels of perceived room dignity and judicial
knowledge, it had no statistically significant effect upon a respondent's
perception of judicial attention, understanding, and respect. These results
may be naively interpreted to conclude that judicial robes act to enhance
an advocate's perception of room dignity. However, as we will show
later, while the positive effect of robes upon perceived knowledge can be
solely attributed to that attire, it is location that dictated the dignity effect.
4. The Effect of Location
We now turn our attention to the effect of location. Line 2 of Table 3
compares the response rankings of respondents who argued in a
courtroom to those whose arguments took place in a conference room.
The Mann-Whitney test statistics reveal a statistically significant strong
positive effect of the courtroom setting (versus conference room) upon the
response to the statement that the judge was respectful, 39 and the dignity
of the room. 4 0 There was no statistically significant effect between the
conference room and the courtroom upon perceptions of judicial attention
to the respondent, the judge's understanding of the arguments of either
advocate, the respect shown to the opposing advocate, and the knowledge
displayed by the judge or the justice of the decision.
ANOVA are inapplicable due to the nature of our data. Instead, we conduct an ordinal comparison
and apply the Mann-Whitney test of significance. See Appendix, infra page 241. That test is non-
parametric in that it allows us to assess whether two independent samples are obtained from the same
distribution without specifying or assuming the underlying distributional form. See Appendix, infra
page 241.
36. Table 3, at Line 1.
37. Statement 13, supra page 230.
38. Statement 16, supra page 231.
39. Statement 14, supra page 230.
40. Statement 16, supra page 231.
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Similar results are obtained when the response rankings from
arguments held in a courtroom are compared with those obtained from
arguments held in a moot courtroom. 41 Again the setting is perceived by
respondents to be significantly more dignified than the moot courtroom,
though the effect on perceived judicial respect did not appear.
A comparison of the response rankings arising from arguments held in
a conference room against those held in a moot courtroom yields no
statistically significant differences except from that associated with
perceived dignity.4 2 That is, respondents perceived conference rooms to
be more dignified than moot courtrooms. The latter finding reflects the
reality that the moot courtrooms used for the exercise were reconfigured
class rooms whereas virtually all of the conference rooms were well-
appointed rooms in large law firms. Apart from that, the two locations
produce no statistically significant different responses.
The above three comparisons reveal that the setting in which the
argument was held affected the respondents' evaluation of some
dependent variables. Courtrooms were perceived to be the most dignified
followed by the conference rooms with the moot courtrooms being the
least dignified. Moreover, respondents who argued in courtrooms
perceived judges to be more respectful than respondents who argued in
conference rooms.
5. The Interaction Between Robes and Location
We will now proceed to analyze the effect of robes within the three
different locations. Line Five of Table Three compares the responses of
those who argued in a courtroom before a judge in a robe with those who
argued in a courtroom before a judge who presided in normal business
attire.43 The comparisons in Line Five reveal that respondents who argued
in courtrooms before a judge in robes perceived the judges to be more
knowledgeable than did those who argued before judges without robes.
What is also of interest is the fact that robes had no effect upon the
perceived dignity of the locations.
Lines Six and Seven show the same effect when the argument took
place in moot courtrooms and conference rooms, with those arguing
before judges in robes reporting a higher perceived level of knowledge
than those in business attire." The consistency of that effect across all
three locations gives strong evidence of a positive role of robes in a
crucial aspect of perceived judicial function (i.e. the judge's knowledge of
41. Table3,atLine3.
42. Id. at Line 4.
43. Id. at Line 5.
44. Id. at Lines 6-7.
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the issue being argued). That result is consistent with the findings of
Rehman et al. to the extent that appropriate professional attire has a
favorable effect upon perceived competence of a medical professional.4 5
6. Effect of Location: Arguing Before a Robed Judge
Next, we report the effect of location after controlling for robes, the
results of which are reported in Line Eight through Line Thirteen of Table
Three.46 First, we restrict our attention to responses from advocates who
argued before a judge in robes.4 7 Comparing the responses of advocates
who argued in conference rooms to those in courtrooms we find two
statistically significant effects. First, advocates perceived robed judges to
be more respectful in a courtroom setting and, as to be expected,
courtrooms were found to be more dignified than conference rooms.4 8
Second, those who argued in courtrooms found their surroundings to be
more dignified than those arguing in moot courtrooms, though there was
no statistically significant effect on respect. 49 Comparing advocates
arguing before robed judges in conference rooms with those in moot
courtrooms,50 we found marginal statistical evidence (i.e. statistical
significance at the ten percent level in a two-tailed test and at the five
percent level in a one-tailed test) of advocates in conference rooms
perceiving judges to be more respectful compared to those arguing in
moot courtrooms. We can see from these results that the differences in the
surroundings, in large, affected the perception of respect and dignity.
7. Effect of Location: Arguing Before a Judge in Business Attire
When we restrict our attention to advocates arguing before judges in
business attire (i.e. without robes) and compare the responses from those
arguing in courtrooms to those in conference rooms, we notice several
significant effects. Line Eleven in Table Three reveals that advocates in
courtrooms perceived those judges to be more attentive and
knowledgeable (these results are marginally statistically significant) than
those in conference rooms.5' Also, consistent with previous results, the
dignity of the courtrooms was perceived to be strongly statistically higher
than that of the conference rooms.
Comparing advocates arguing in courtrooms to those in moot
45. See Rehman et al., supra note 11.
46. Table 3, at Lines 8-13.
47. Id at Lines 8-10.
48. Id. at Line 8.
49. Id. at Line 9.
50. Id. at Line 10.
51. Id at Line 11.
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courtroomS 52 and those arguing in conference rooms to those in moot
courtrooms, we obtain somewhat similar results. Advocates appearing
before judges wearing business attire and presiding in courtrooms
perceived the location to be more dignified than other locations, but
perceived no other differences.
IV. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
We began our investigation by looking at the rank correlations between
a measure of a student advocate's perception of the dignity of the location
and a range of variables measuring perceived judicial behavior. Using two
different measures of rank correlations, we found them to be positive and
statistically significant for all our variables of interest. Thus we have a
general finding that perceptions of room dignity and assessments of
judicial behavior are positively related. That is an important finding for
two reasons. First, procedural dignity has been found to be part of the
heuristic by which ordinary people judge the fairness of court
proceedings.54 A dignified setting may be taken as a signal that the
participant is being treated respectfully. Second, if replicated in other
studies, it should influence courtroom design as well as judges' choices of
venues for hearing motions and other proceedings. Motivated by that, we
proceeded to control for two elements that we posit to be important
determinants of room dignity-judicial costume and location. Taking the
aggregate data we first compared the response rankings of students
arguing before a judge who wore a robe to those arguing before a judge
who did not, regardless of location. We found that those arguing before
judges in robes perceived the room to be more dignified and the judges to
be more knowledgeable. As mentioned previously, taking that result at
face value ignores the possible interaction between the effect of the robe
and the location. We then partitioned the data by location and compared
pair-wise the response rankings between those arguing in courtrooms,
conference rooms, and moot courtrooms. Our results revealed a strong
location effect, as courtrooms were perceived to be more dignified than
both conference rooms and moot courtrooms and conference rooms were
perceived to be more dignified than moot courtrooms. Moreover, those
arguing in courtrooms perceived the judge to be more respectful
compared to those in conference rooms. No further statistical differences
were found in the response rankings when we compared observations
from conference rooms with those in moot courtrooms.
52. Id. at Line 12.
53. Id. at Line 13.
54. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 6, at 80.
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Since the robe was found to have the effect of making a room more
dignified and the judge appear more knowledgeable when we considered
the aggregated data, we attempted to disentangle the effects of both robes
and location. To do so, we first analyzed the effect of robes within
specific locations.
Limiting our attention to responses from those arguing before judges by
location, our results revealed that those arguing before a judge who wore
robes perceived the judge to be more knowledgeable than those arguing
before a judge in business attire. The consistency of that result across all
three locations indicates that, at least for this sample, the judicial robe
promotes a positive view of the judge, regardless of the location of the
legal proceeding studied. Recall that the relevant survey question asked
the students to indicate the degree of their agreement with the statement
that "the judge was knowledgeable about the legal issue involved in the
case."55 Because of the controversy regarding the desirability of robes, we
believe this to be one of our most interesting and important findings. We
may assume that judges who are knowledgeable about the issue before
them are preferred to those less knowledgeable. Jerome Frank, whose
critical view of the robe we discussed above, allowed that the robe might
increase respect for the judge. Our study lends support for that view and
therefore arguably undercuts Frank's emphatically negative position. It
should be noted that our finding is consistent with the previously-
referenced study of the effect of attire on patient evaluation of
physicians.56 Nonetheless, one cannot rule out the possible effect of the
robe on the judge. It is possible that the expectation of presiding in a robe,
and therefore acting as a "symbol" of the justice system, incentivizes the
judge to take the case more seriously and that robed judges are therefore
more likely to actually be more knowledgeable about the issues presented.
This Essay does not address the effect of attire on the judge's knowledge
of the issues presented by the moot court argument. We could not make
an accurate assessment of the judges' knowledge with the tools available
to us, i.e. student reporting. Nor do we think that a judge's self-
assessment of her degree of knowledge would have been sufficiently
reliable to use as a variable. Our intuition is that it is unlikely that a
lawyer, law professor, or judge preparing to preside over a moot court
argument would be much affected by their prospective attire. In any
event, even assuming that the student assessment of knowledge was
influenced by the judge's actual displayed knowledge, our finding that
robes "matter" remains important.
Frank might have responded to our finding by noting that the student
55. Statement 13, supra page 230.
56. Rehman et al., supra note 1 1,passim.
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advocates made subjective judgments about the judges' knowledge of the
issues and that the robe may have led them to mistaken and in any case
unwarranted conclusions. Indeed, Frank might have turned our finding
against the robe precisely because of its potentially misleading effect.
Like the "procedural fairness effect" found by Lind, Tyler, and others,s7
judicial ceremony may promote false confidence in the justice system. Of
course, if contrary to our intuition the robe in fact incentivizes the judge
to be better prepared, the student assessments would be accurate and the
ensuing confidence in the judge would be well-placed. If the student
assessment of judicial knowledge is solely or primarily a result of judicial
attire the problem of false consciousness does arise. The normative issue
thus raised is beyond the scope of this Essay but we note that public
respect for the judicial process is generally considered desirable.
For completeness we then controlled for attire and compared the
responses of student advocates in different locations. First restricting our
attention to responses from advocates arguing before a judge in robes, our
results revealed that those arguing in courtrooms found judges to be more
respectful relative to those arguing in conference rooms, and that
courtrooms were perceived to be statistically strongly more dignified than
conference rooms. That strong dignity effect is consistent with the results
of our prior comparison of courtroom and conference room responses.
When again restricting our attention to responses from advocates arguing
before a judge in robes and comparing the responses from students
arguing in courtrooms to those arguing in moot courtrooms, we found no
statistical differences in assessment of judicial function. The only
statistically significant effects we found when performing these
comparisons were that courtrooms were perceived to be more dignified
than moot courtrooms and conference rooms, which again highlights the
expected strong location effect of the room on perceived dignity. When
we compare the responses of those arguing before judges in robes in
conference rooms to those in moot courtrooms, we find marginal evidence
of those arguing in conference rooms being accorded a higher level of
respect but no difference in the dignity of the room. In other words,
advocates arguing before judges in robes in a conference room setting
found the location to be as dignified as those arguing before robed judges
in moot courtrooms. The evidence of greater perceived judicial respect in
courtrooms compared to conference rooms and between conference
rooms and moot courtrooms serves to highlight the interaction or
interplay between the effects of judicial attire and different settings. We
can theorize that the combination of robe and dignity of the room
57. Lind et al., supra note 5, at 61-66.
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contributes to a positive evaluation of respect because the two elements
combine to enhance the sense of status of the student advocate.
We also focused our attention on responses from advocates arguing
before judges in business attire and compared the response rankings
between our three locations. Without robes, the location effect is less
pronounced, with marginal statistical evidence showing that advocates
arguing in courtrooms perceived judges to be more attentive and
knowledgeable when compared to those arguing in conference rooms.
There was also strong evidence of greater perceived room dignity. No
differences were found when we compared observations between moot
courtrooms and courtrooms, or between conference rooms and moot
courtrooms, except that the conference rooms and courtrooms were again
found to be more dignified than moot courtrooms.
Notably, we found that the variable just, which reflected the student's
assessment of the justice of the judge's decision (if a decision was
announced) was not a statistically significant variable in any of our tests
involving comparisons of location and costume (i.e. the assessment of the
decision on the merits was not influenced by setting or judicial costume).
However, when we partitioned the data by comparing those whose side
the decision favored with those on the losing side we found strong
evidence that the victorious advocates were more likely to believe the
decision to be just. The "victors" also reported a far more positive
assessment of judicial behavior than did the "losers." The former group
found that the judge had exhibited greater attentiveness, respect,
understanding, and knowledge. These results are intuitively sensible and
are in general consistent with those prior investigations of the psychology
of procedural justice. Those investigations have found that a favorable
substantive result correlates with a positive assessment of the process,
even though procedural fairness factors also contribute to it." The
consistency of our results with prior studies on this aspect lends credence
to our empirical technique and findings. Judicial ceremony may be one of
the heuristics that participants use in evaluating the process by priming
them to credit the bona fides of the judge.
CONCLUSION
We believe that our study shows that setting and judicial attire can and
do affect the evaluation ofjudicial behavior by student advocates and that,
in general, the use of culturally appropriate ceremonial aspects enhanced
their evaluation of the judicial process. Of course, one must be cautious
about generalizing from the student sample. First-year law students are
58. Seeid at970-71, 975.
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distinct in various ways from the general population of litigants and other
participants in litigation. The pursuance of a law degree arguably suggests
in itself some degree of acceptance of the legitimacy of the litigation
process and its "signs." Second, the first year of law school may well have
primed students to be more respectful of the judicial process than they
would be otherwise. On the other hand, spending the better part of a year
analyzing cases (and often hearing a critical professorial view) might be
expected to arm students against the influence of judicial ceremony.
Moreover, law students may be useful proxies for one major cohort of
litigation consumers: practicing attorneys. In any event, despite these
limitations, our results strongly suggest that judicial costume and setting
do account for differences in perceptions of procedural fairness. Further
research on the effects of judicial ceremony using different samples and
settings is strongly recommended.
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To compute Spearman's rank correlation p we let and denote the ranks
assigned to observations and respectively, is defined as
JR(x,)R(y,)-n 
2
R(x)2! 2 R(y,) - n ± 12
To compute the above object we merely have to replace the
observations in our data set with their ranks and compute Pearson's
correlation coefficient on the ranks. Spearman's rank correlation may
therefore be thought of as a special case of Pearson's correlation
coefficient and is interpreted in the same way with positive values
indicating a tendency for high values of one variable to be paired with
high values of the other.
If no relationship should exist between room dignity and our measures
of judicial function, our computed rank correlations should not be
statistically different from zero. If we reject this hypothesis, we can
conclude that dignified surroundings are related to perceptions of judicial
function and behavior. For large samples, critical values to determine
significance are well approximated by a standard normal distribution.
KENDALL'S TAU
To compute Kendall's Tau, T let (x l, yl), (x2, y2),.. . ,(xn, yn) be a set
of joint observations from two random variables X and Y respectively,
such that all the values of (xi) and (yi) are unique. Any pair of
observations (xi, yi) and (xj, yj) are said to be concordant if the ranks for
both elements agree: that is, if both xi > xj and yi > yj or if both xi < xj
and yi < yj. They are said to be discordant, if xi > xj and yi < yj or if xi <
xj and yi > yj. If xi = xj or yi = yj, the pair is neither concordant, nor
disconcordant.




If the agreement between the two rankings is perfect (i.e., the two
rankings are the same) the coefficient has value I while if the
disagreement between the two rankings is perfect (i.e., one ranking is the
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reverse of the other) the coefficient has value -1. Should the two variables
be independent then we would expect the coefficient to be approximately
zero. For large samples critical values are well approximated by normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance 2(2n +5)
9n(n - 1)
THE MANN- WHITNEY TEST
Assume that two random samples {x1,x2, ... ,X, }, {Y1Y2' ...JI }drawn
from distributions F( ) and G( ) respectively, are said to be obtained
from the same population if and only if F( ) is precisely equal to G( )
The Mann Whitney test therefore has as its null hypothesis:
Ho : F(X)= G(X)
One can also think of the Mann Whitney procedure as testing the null
hypothesis that the probability of an observation from one population
exceeding an observation from the second population to be precisely 0.5.
Intuitively, under the null hypothesis, if one were to combine observations
from both samples into a single ordered sample and assign ranks from the
smallest value to the largest, the sum of the ranks assigned to the values
from one sample should not differ greatly to the sum of ranks assigned to
the other. It follows that the null hypothesis may be rejected if the ranks
associated with one sample tend to be larger than those of the other
sample. If there are little or no ties in the data, the associated test statistic
is computed as the sum of the ranks assigned to one sample. Letting
denote the rank assigned to observation the test statistic is defined as
i= I
If there are many ties, as is the case in our data, an alternative form of
the test statistic is used
T-nN+1
T= 2
nm R2 nm(N+ 1)2
N(N - 1) 4(N -1
ZR2
Where ' refers to the sum of squares of the average ranks used
in both samples and N= n + m. For sample sizes above 20 the test
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statistic is well approximated by a standard normal random variable.
Table A-i:
Spearman's Rank Correlations Between
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Table A-3:Mann Whitney Test Results
Comparison attme attop underme underop
1 Robe vs. No Robe 0.3667 0.1898 0.6617 0.2182
[-0.9026] [-1.31111 [-0.4376] [-1.2313]
2 Court Room vs. Conf. 0.1639 0.9728 0.7688 0.4946
Room [1.3922] [-0.0341] [0.2940] [-0.6830]
3 Court Room vs. Moot 0.3560 0.8493 0.4561 0.5460
Court Room f-0.923 11 [-0.1901] f-0.74521 [0.6038]
4 Conf. Room vs. Moot 0.8586 0.7649 0.5548 0.9493
Court Room [0.17821 [-0.2990] [-0.5905] [0.0636]
5 Court Room: Robe vs. 0.2673 0.3381 0.9119 0.3752
No Robe [1.1092] [0.9579] [0.1106] [0.8868]
6 Conf. Room: Robe vs. 0.2007 0.4920 0.1686 0.0545
No Robe [-1.2797] [-0.6871] [-1.3767] [-1.9228]
7 Moot Court Room: 0.9569 0.5090 0.3868 0.2301
Robe vs. No Robe [-0.0540] [-0.6604] [0.8654] r1.20021
8 Robe: Court Room vs. 0.3418 0.9766 0.2592 0.5919
Conf. Room [-0.9507] [0.0294] [-1.1283] [-0.5360]
9 Robe: Court Room vs. 0.9401 0.9852 0.9547 0.1657
Moot Court Room [-0.0751] [-0.01861 [0.0568] [1.3863]
10 Robe: Conf. Room vs. 0.3802 0.9074 0.2752 0.0402
Moot Court Room [-0.87761 [0.1163] [-1.0913] [-2.0518]
11 No Robe: Court Room 0.0812 0.5557 0.9261 0.8253
vs. Conf. Room 11.74381 [0.5892] [0.0927] [-0.2207]
12 No Robe: Court Room 0.1754 0.6672 0.3164 0.5906
vs. Moot Court Room [-1.3552] [-0.43011 [-1.0018] [-0.5380]
13 No Robe: Conf. Room 1.0000 0.9576 0.2478 0.3612
vs. Moot Court Room [0.0000] [0.05321 [-1.1558] [-0.9131]
14 Favor vs. Not in Favor 0.0339 0.2217 8.16E-04 0.0440
[2.12121 [-1.22211 [3.3472] 12.0137]
Note [a]: Statistical comparisons of variables attme, attop, underme, underop, knowledge,
resme, resop and dignity for line 1-13 were performed using 287 observations. The just
variable comparisons for all 14 lines were performed using 174 observations since not all
judgments were reported. Also, line 14 comparisons utilized 174 observations.
Note [b]: Statistically significant results at the 5% level for a two-sided test are marked as
bold while results which are statistically significant at the 10% for a two-sided test or 5%
for a one-sided test are marked as bold and italicized.
Note [c]: Values reported in the table represent the Mann Whitney U-Test statistics while
the values located directly below in parentheses are the associated z-values.
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knowledge resme resop dignified just
2.62E-12 0.9986 0.3632 0.0171 0.3107 1
[6.9967] [-0.0018] [-0.9092] [2.38371 [-1.0138]
0.2330 0.0193 0.4192 5.69E-11 0.8675 2
[1.1926] 12.33871 [0.8077] [6.5517] [-0.1668]
0.9749 0.1534 0.7148 1.81E-13 0.6939 3
[-0.3170] [-1.4275] [-0.3654] [7.3621] [-0.3935]
1.1821 0.5326 0.7347 3.56E-04 -0.7730 4
0.1160 [0.6240] [0.33891 [3.57101 [-0.7730]
2.02E-04 0.9178 0.2291 0.9709 0.9671 5
[3.71681 [-0.1032] [1.2027] [-0.0365] [-0.0413]
1.44E-05 0.2151 0.6109 0.7830 0.2489 6
14.33811 [-1.2398] [-0.5088] [0.2754] [-1.15301
2.58E-04 0.1823 0.5467 0.1400 0.7914 7
[3.65441 [1.3337] [-0.6027] [1.4756] [-0.2645]
0.3210 0.0373 0.8064 4.46E-04 0.6228 8
[0.9924] f2.08251 [-0.245 1] [3.51131 [-0.4919]
0.5109 0.7159 0.9773 8.23E-06 0.7583 9
[0.6574] [-0.3639 [ -0.0285] 14.45911 [-0.3077]
0.7489 0.0911 0.8508 0.1863 0.8126 10
[0.32011 [1.68971 [-0.1881] [1.3218] [-0.2371]
0.0856 0.7162 0.1710 2.39E-06 0.8446 11
[1.71921 [0.3635] [1.3690] [4.71761 [-0.1960]
0.5453 0.4535 0.5003 1.27E-08 0.7839 12
[0.6048] [-0.7496] [-0.67391 15.6907] [0.2742]
0.3669 0.4316 0.5812 3.28E-04 0.4985 13
[-0.9022] [-0.7865] [0.5516] [3.59241 [-0.6769]
0.0544 4.41E-04 0.0272 0.7453 3.43E-14 14
[1.9735] [3.5143] [2.20851 [-0.3249] [7.5810]
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